Kant's Doctrine Of The A Priori In The Light Of Contemporary Biology Konrad Lorenz

KONRADLORENZ

Kant's Doctrine of the A Priori in the Light
of Contemporary Biology

For Kant, the categories of space, time, cau-
sality, etc., are givens established a priori, de-
termining the form of all of our experience,
and indeed making experience possible. For
Kant, the validity of these primary principles
of reason is absolute. This validity is funda-
mentally independent of the laws of the real
nature which lies behind appearances. This
validity is not to be thought of as arising from
these laws. The a priori categories and forms
of intuition cannot be related to the laws in-
herent in the "thing-in-itself" by abstraction
or any other means. 1 The only thing we can
assert about the thing-in-itself, according to
Kant, is the reality of its existence. The rela-
tionship that exists between it and the form in
which it affects our senses and appears in our
world of experience is, for Kant, alogical (to
somewhat overstate it). For Kant, the thing-
in-itself is on principle unknowable, because
the form of its appearance is determined by
the purely ideal forms and categories of intu-
ition, so that its appearance has no connec-
tion with its essence. This is the viewpoint of
Kantian "transcendental" or "critical" ideal-
lsm > restated in a condensed version.

Kant's orientation has been transformed
v ery liberally by various natural philosophers.
,n particular, the ever more urgent question-
m gs of the theory of evolution have led to con-
options of the a priori which are perhaps not
*° far removed from those of Kant himself as
rom th °se of the Kantian philosopher tied
10 the exact terms of Kant's definition of his
concepts.

The biologist convinced of the fact of the
8«at creative events of evolution asks of Kant
.j** questions: Is not human reason with all
Tories and forms of intuition something

that has

organically evolved in a continuous

^-effect relationship with the laws of the
'^mediate nature, just as has the human brain?

Would not the laws of reason necessary for a
priori thought be entirely different if they had
undergone an entirely different historical
mode of origin, and if consequently we had
been equipped with an entirely different kind
of central nervous system? Is it at all probable
that the laws of our cognitive apparatus should
be disconnected with those of the real exter-
nal world? Can an organ that has evolved in
the process of a continuous coping with the
laws of nature have remained so uninfluenced
that the theory of appearances can be pursued
independently of the existence of the thmg-
in-itself, as if the two were totally independent
of each other? In answering these quesUons
the biologist takes a sharply f cumscnbed
point of view. The exposition of this point of
view is the subject of the present paper. We are
not'st concerned with special discuss** of
space, time, and causality. The latter are for

our study simply examples of the Kanmnthe^
ory of the a priori, and are treated incdentalty
to our comparison of the views of the a pnon
taken by transcendental idealism and the

b tfthe duty of the natural +
tempt a natural explanation before he con
S himself with drawing r°J£2&
raneous to nature. This f^^ ^

is due to hereditary dl f chir -

acteristic of the ^f^ in U* 0~
disposes ^;J ncepti onof the'apri-
must realize th ^^ destr ^tion of the
orf as an organ means

concept: something natural
tionary adaptation to the laws otu«

KONRAD LORENZ

external world has evolved a posteriori in a
certain sense, even if in a way entirely differ-
ent from that of abstraction or deduction from
previous experience. The functional similari-
ties which have led many researchers to La-
marckian views about the origin of hereditary
modes of reaction from previous "species ex-
perience" today are recognized as completely
misleading.

The essential character of the natural sci-
ences of today signifies such an abandonment
of transcendental idealism that a rift has de-
veloped between the scientist and the Kantian
philosopher. The rift is caused by the funda-
mental change of the concepts of the thing-in-
itself and the transcendental, a change which
results from the redefinition of the concept of
the a priori. If the "a priori" apparatus of pos-
sible experience with all its forms of intuition
and categories is not something immutably
determined by factors extraneous to nature
but rather something that mirrors the natural
aws in contact with which it has evolved in
the closest reciprocal interaction, then the
boundaries of the transcendental begin to

olw? yaSPeCtS ° fthethin 8- in - itselfw hich
^pletely escape being experienced by our

experience m the near future, geologically

existent can b xn er l the abs ° luteI y

organism has SFT?* hj ° ne ? artkular
the Cam "T ^ influen « on
consider^ a qUCStl ° n - H ° Wever > su <*

itself behind the 11 ° f the thin S" in -
in his specuttfo^T 3 - FM Kant (who
only matu'e v St ^ C ° nside ^
^mutable system , re P resen ting an

cle Presented^ f God > - obsta-

itself as basica v ' ^ the th ing-in-

^Voflooking [ it T° 8n u ble - In hisstat -
^Possible exL il! C °f include the limit

thing-in-its e rCl^ thedefiniti ° noft ^
18 hmit W0U W be the sam e

232

for man and amoeba — infinitely far from the
thing-in-itself. In view of the indubitable fact
of evolution this is no longer tenable. Even if
we recognize that the absolutely existent will
never be completely knowable (even for the
highest imaginable living beings there will
be a limit set by the necessity of categorical
forms of thought), the boundary separating
the experienceable from the transcendental
must vary for each individual type of organ-
ism. The location of the boundary has to be
investigated separately for each type of or-
ganism. It would mean an unjustifiable an-
thropomorphism to include the purely acci-
dental present-day location of this boundary
for the human species in the definition of the
thing-in-itself. If, in spite of the indubitable
evolutionary modifiability of our apparatus ot
experience one nevertheless wanted to con-
tinue to define the thing-in-itself as that which
is uncognizable for this very apparatus, the
definition of the absolute would thereby beheld
to be relative, obviously an absurdity. Rather,
every natural science urgently needs a concep
of the absolutely real which is as little anthro-
pomorphic and as independent as pos* o
the accidental, present-day location of the i
its of the humanly experienceable. The a
lutely actual can in no way be a matter o
degree to which it is reflected in the bra*
human, or any other temporary form,
other hand, it is the object of a most imp
tant branch of comparative science to in
gate the type of this reflection, and to fl
the extent to which it is in the form ot c : ■
simplifying symbols which are only sp^
daily analogous or to what extent it rep ^
details, i.e., how far its exactness P^J^
investigation of prehuman forms ot " jo „.
we hone to train clues to the mode ot u ^

we hope to gain clues U, «

ing and historical origin of our ^
edge, and in this manner to push *
critique of knowledge further than
ble without such comparisons.

ahea'
wasp 089 '

- — * i oHentis' 5 "

I assert that nearly all natural of

today, at least all hiolo Z ist$ \ C T ily yo^,
unconsciously assume in their a ' , jtse lf
real relationship between the : WS ^
and the phenomena of our subjec

ot

KANT AND CONTEMPORARY BIOLOGY

ence, but a relationship that is by no means a
"purely" ideal one in the Kantian sense. I even
would like to assert that Kant himself as-
sumed this in all the results of his own em-
pirical research. In our opinion, the real rela-
tionship between the thing-in-itself and the
specific a priori form of its appearance has
been determined by the fact that the form of
appearance has developed as an adaptation to
the laws of the thing-in-itself in the coping
negotiation with these continuously present
laws during the evolutionary history of man-
kind, lasting hundreds of millennia. This ad-
aptation has provided our thought with an
innate structuralization which corresponds
to a considerable degree to the reality of the
external world. "Adaptation" is a word already
loaded with meaning and easily misunder-
stood. It should not, in the present condition,
denote more than that our forms of intuition
and categories "fit" to that which really exists
in the manner in which our foot fits the floor
or the fin of the fish suits the water. The a priori
which determines the forms of appearance
of the real things of our world is, in short, an
0r g a n, or more precisely the functioning of
an organ. We come closer to understanding

e a P" " if we confront it with the ques-
tions asked of everything organic: "What for,"
where from," and "why." These questions are,
rst, how does it preserve the species; second,

at is its genealogical origin; third, what
"atural causes make it possible? We are con-
v 'nced that the a priori is based on central
nervous systems which are entirely as real as
th 'ngs of the external world whose phe-
nomenal form they determine for us. This cen-
nervo "s apparatus does not prescribe the
h WS of natur e any more than the hoof of the
as th ^" escribes the for m of the ground. lust
apo 6 tne horse, this central nervous

Paratus stumbles over unforeseen changes

adaoV?' BUt jUSt as the hoof of the horse iS
cope t0 ground of the ste PP e which il
tus / Wltl1 ' S ° our centra l nervous appara-
ajj ° r 0r 8 aniz ing the image of the world is

to co t0 the real world with which man has
has alT • * USt . like an Y organ, this apparatus
ai ned its expedient species-preserving

form through this coping of real with the real
during its genealogical evolution, lasting
many eons.

Our view of the origin of the "a priori" (an
origin which in a certain sense is "a posteri-
ori") answers very fittingly Kant's question as
to whether the forms of perception of space
and time, which we do not derive from expe-
rience (as Kant, contrary to Hume, empha-
sizes quite correctly) but which are a priori in
our representation "were not mere chimeras
of the brain made by us to which no object
corresponds, at least not adequately." 2 If we
conceive our intellect as the function of an
organ (and there is no valid argument against
this), our obvious answer to the question why
its form of function is adapted to the real
world is simply the following: Our categories
and forms of perception, fixed prior to indi-
vidual experience, are adapted to the external
world for exactly the same reasons as the hoof
of the horse is already adapted to the ground
of the steppe before the horse is born and the
fin of the fish is adapted to the water before
the fish hatches. No sensible person believes
that in any of these cases the form of the or-
gan "prescribes" its properties to the object.
To everyone it is self-evident that water pos-
sesses its properties independently of whether
the fins of the fish are biologically adapted to
these properties or not. Quite evidently some
properties of the thing-in-itself which .u at he
Ltom of the phenomenon "water have ed
to the specific form of adaptation of the fins
which have been evolved independently of one
another by fishes, reptiles birds, mammals, ce-
phalopods, snails, crayfish, arrow worm, etc
It is obviously the properties of water hat
Le prescribed to these different organ ms
the corresponding form and function of the»r

reeard to structure and mode 01 ™ n "
Mf own brain, ^T^J^Z.

233

KONRAD LORENZ

their relation to sensibility, I should like to
know how it could be found possible to know
a priori and thus prior to all acquaintance
with things, namely before they are given to
us, what their intuition must be like, which
is the case here with space and time." 3 This
question clarifies two very important facts.
First, it shows that Kant, no more than Hume,
thought of the possibility of a formal adapta-
tion between thought and reality other than
through abstracting from previous experience.
Second, it shows that he assumed the impos-
sibility of any different form of origin. Fur-
thermore, it shows the great and fundamen-
tally new discovery of Kant, i.e., that human
thought and perception have certain func-
tional structures prior to every individual
experience.

Most certainly Hume was wrong when he
wanted to derive all that is a priori from that
which the senses supply to experience, just as
wrong as Wundt or Helmholtz, who simply
explain it as an abstraction from preceding
experience. Adaptation of the a priori to the
real world has no more originated from "ex-
perience" than has adaptation of the fin of the
fish to the properties of water. Just as the form
of the fin is given a priori, prior to any indi-
vidual coping of the young fish with the water,
and ,ust as it is this form that makes possible
this coping: so is it also the case with our
terms of perception and categories in their re-
lation^ to our coping with the real external
world by Qf exper . ence ^

here a re specific limitations to the forms of
expenence which are possible. We believe we

p 2"ZT T T th , e dosest functional

an.maa pno „ Sandourhuma

U CTo " ty ° f a > re " of the in-

would be lb '; 5 ^ Sdence > how ^er,

J™ of these structure" and h ™~
b «ic biological <Z anddoesnot Pose the
^cies-pr ese ^ no q ° n conce ™ing their
P^emng meaning. Bluntly speak-

234

ing, it is just as if someone wanted to write a
"pure" theory on the characteristics of a mod-
ern photographic camera, a Leica for example,
without taking into consideration that this
is an apparatus for photographing the exter-
nal world, and without consulting the pictures
the camera produces which enable one to un-
derstand its function and the essential mean-
ing of its existence. As far as the produced
pictures (just as experiences) are concerned,
the Leica is entirely a priori. It exists prior to
and independently of every picture; indeed,
it determines the form of the pictures, nay,
makes them possible in the first place. Now 1
assert: To separate "pure Leicology" from the
theory of the pictures it produces is just as
meaningless as to separate the theory of the a
priori from the theory of the external worW,
of phenomenology from the theory of the
thing-in-itself. All the lawfulnesses of our in-
tellect which we find to be there a prion are
not freaks of nature. We live off them! And*
can get insight into their essential .mam
only if we take into consideration their tu
tion. Just as the Leica could not origmatew.t^
out the activity of photography, carne
long before the Leica was constructed, J
the completed Leica with all its mci : ■
well-conceived and "fitting" construction
tails has not dropped from the heavens,
ther has our infinitely more wondertu P
reason." This, too, has arrived at its id** J*
fection from out of its activity, from
tiation with the thing-in-itself. ^
Although for the transcendenta ^
the relationship between the tm ^ ^
and its appearance is extraneous _
and alogical, it is entirely real for u -f^.
tain that not only does the thing-i ^
feet" our receptors, but also vice ve
fectors on their part affect" abs0 rb 'to
The word "actually" comes from t ■ w
act." (Wirklichkeit kommt von Wi^ ^ #
appears in our world is by no me ^ eJ .
experience one-sidedly influence
ternal things as they work on u ^ ^
the lenses of the ideal possibility ?

ence. What we witness as exp
a coping of the real in us

0$

KANT AND CONTEMPORARY BIOLOGY

of us. Therefore, the relationship between the
events in and outside of us is not alogical and
does not basically prohibit drawing conclu-
sions about the lawfulness of the external
world from the lawfulness of the internal
events. Rather, this relationship is the one
which exists between image and object, be-
tween a simplified model and the real thing. It
is the relationship of an analogy of greater or
less remoteness. The degree of this analogy is
fundamentally open to comparative investi-
gation. That is, it is possible to make state-
ments as to whether agreement between ap-
pearance and actuality is more exact or less
exact in comparing one human being to an-
other, or one living organism to another.

On these premises also depends the self-
evident fact that there are more and less cor-
rect judgments about the external world. The
relationship between the world of phenomena
and things-in-themselves is thus not fixed
once-and-for-all by ideal laws of form which
are extraneous to nature and in principle in-
accessible to investigation. Neither do the
judgments made on the basis of these "neces-
sities of thought" have an independent and
absolute validity. Rather, all our forms of in-
tuition and categories are thoroughly natural.
Like every other organ, they are evolutionary
developed receptacles for the reception and
retroactive utilization of those lawful conse-
quences of the thing-in-itself with which we

ave to cope if we want to remain alive and
Preserve our species. The special form of these
organic receptacles has the properties of the
th «ng-in-itself a relationship grown entirely
°ut of real natural connections. The organic
re «ptacles are adapted to these properties in
a manner that has a practical biological suffi-
Cle ncy, but which is by no means absolute nor
^en so precise that one could say theif form

T>ls th *t of the thing-in-itself. Even if we as
f " ral scientists are in a certain sense naive

tS w We sti11 do not take the a PP earance for
for 8 " in ~ itself nor the experienced reality
r he absolutely existent. Thus, we are not
ta ^ Pnsedt0 find the laws of "pure reason" en-
onl • m the most serious contradictions not
y w «h one another, but also with the em-

pirical facts whenever research demands
greater precision. This happens particularly
where physics and chemistry enter the nuclear
phase. There, not only does the intuition-form
of space-perception break down, but also the
categories of causality, or substantiality, and
in a certain sense even quantity (even though
quantity otherwise appears to have the most
unconditional validity except for the intuition-
form of time-perception). "Necessary for
thought" in no way means "absolutely valid"
in view of these empirical facts, highly essen-
tial in nuclear physics, quantum mechanics,
and wave theory.

The realization that all laws of "pure rea-
son" are based on highly physical or mechani-
cal structures of the human central nervous
system which have developed through many
eons like any other organ, on the one hand
shakes our confidence in the laws of pure rea-
son and on the other hand substantially raises
our confidence in them. Kant's statement that
the laws of pure reason have absolute validity,
nay, that every imaginable rational being,
even if it were an angel, must obey the same
laws of thought, appears as an anthropocentnc
presumption. Surely the "keyboard provided

by the forms of intuition and categones-fcmt
himself calls it that-is something definitely
located on the physicostructural side of he
psychophysical unity of the human orgasm.
The forms of intuition and categories relate to
the "freedom" of the mind (if there is ^ *
thing) as physical structures are usuall re

psychic, namely by both
straining at the same time. But
clumsy categorical boxes mto which , wehave
to pack our external world <m < >^ r * *
to spell them as experiences' (KanO can claim

and I would indeed like to kn ^
tine argument cou Id be ^ ^J^.^
conception. At the same "™* . ^ ^t-
nature of their ada P^^^ have
egorical forms f^^^n *
proved themselves as woriang nj i~

235

KONRAD LORENZ

tive

coping of our species with the absolute
ty of the environment (in spite of their
iity being only approximate and rela-
. This is clarified by the paradoxical fact
that the laws of "pure reason" which break
down at every step in modern theoretical sci-
ence nonetheless have stood (and still stand)
the test in the practical biological matters
of the struggle for the preservation of the
species.

The "dots" produced by the coarse "screens"
used in the reproductions of photographs in
our daily papers are satisfactory representa-
tions when looked at superficially, but cannot
stand closer inspection with a magnifying
glass. So, too, the reproductions of the world
by our forms of intuition and categories break
down as soon as they are required to give a
somewhat closer representation of their ob-
jects, as is the case in wave mechanics and
nuclear physics. All the knowledge an indi-
vidual can wrest from the empirical reality
of the "physical world-picture" is essentially
only a working hypothesis. And as far as their
species-preserving function goes, all those in-
nate structures of the mind which we call "a
Pnon are likewise only working hypotheses.
Nothing is absolute except that which hides in
and behind the phenomena. Nothing that our

brain can think has absolute a priori validity
n the true Qf thg wQrd> ^ ^ X

^•w.U,dlh,I Mw . lhekwsofmathe .
^^^^^^^
lmp ° rtant nun's life, without

2 tl S ' { Whkh thus has -ply
l2s^y° &C ^ aS have a » the othel

- a the^ oX ", " ** ^ P ° SSiWe ' * is >
fo- org-: ^ ° f this
that can

nottf l be ° Verestimated - But this
C °"*tin ln d "r n makin 8 ^ absolute.

r«

do a dredeino ™ u- ame manner as

v idual cases J£ i gC number of in <»-
each shovel dredges up rough i y

236

the same amount but actually not even two
can ever have exactly the same content. The
pure mathematical equation is a tautology: 1
state that if my dredging-machine brings in
such and such a number of shovels, then such
and such a number are brought in. Two shov-
els of my machine are absolutely equal to each
other because strictly speaking it is the same
shovel each time, namely the number one. But
only the empty sentence always has this valid-
ity. Two shovels filled with something or other
are never equal to each other, the number one
applied to a real object will never find its equal
in the whole universe. It is true that two plus
two equals four, but two apples, rams, or at-
oms plus two more never equal four others
because no equal apples, rams, or atoms exist.
In this sense we arrive at the paradoxical fact
that the equation two plus two equals fourm
its application to real units, such as apples or
atoms, has a much smaller degree of approxi-
mation to reality than the equation two mil-
lion plus two million equal four million be-
cause the individual dissimilarities of the
counted units level out statistically in the case
of a large number. Regarded as a working T
pothesis or as a functional organ, the form
thought of numerical quantification is a
remains one of the most miraculous appa^
tuses that nature has ever created; it evo
the admiration of the biologist, P artlCU '
by the incredible breadth of its sphere ^
plication even if one does not conside
sphere of validity absolute. . (

It would be entirely conceivable to ifflj
a rational being that does not ^J ioei
means of the mathematical number t
not use 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, the number of in* ^
approximately equal among thernse ^ ^
as rams, atoms, or milestones, to ^
quantity at hand) but grasps these i^
ately in some other way. Instead o ^ q
ing water by the number of the til e ^
sels, one could, for example, cone ^
the tension of a rubber balloon ot
size how much water it contains. ^
well be purely

coincidental, in ° l ^
brought about by purely historical c ^ ^
our brain happens to be able to q

KANT AND CONTEMPORARY BIOLOGY

tensive quantities more readily than intensive
ones. It is by no means a necessity of thought
and it would be entirely conceivable that the
ability to quantify intensively according to
the method indicated by the example of mea-
suring the tension in the rubber balloon could
be developed up to the point where it would
become equally valuable and replace numeri-
cal mathematics. Indeed, the ability to esti-
mate quantities immediately, present in man
and in a number of animals, is probably due
to such an intensive process of quantification.
A mind quantifying in a purely intensive man-
ner would carry out some operations more
simply and immediately than our mathemat-
ics of the "dredging- scoop" variety. For ex-
ample, it might be able to calculate curves
immediately, which is possible in our exten-
sive mathematics only by means of the detour
of integral and differential calculus, a detour
which tides us over the limitations of the nu-
merical steps, but still clings to them concep-
tually. An intellect quantifying purely by in-
tensity would not be able to grasp that two
times two equals four. Since it would have no
understanding for the number one, for our
em pty numerical box, it would also not com-
prehend our postulate of the equality of two
such boxes and would reply to our arrange-
ment of an equation that it is incorrect because
no equal boxes, rams, or atoms exist. And in
re gard to its system, it would be just as correct
| n . lts st atement as we would be in ours. Cer-
ain 'y an intensive quantification system would
Perform many operations more poorly, that is,
n a more involved manner, than does numeri-
a mathematics. The fact that the latter has

infen d S ° mUCh further than the abilit y of
^ensive quantitative estimation speaks for its

and 8 m ° re " practical " one - But even s0 * is
acq • C "l ai ! 1S ° nly an or 8 an > an evolutionarily
basi^n " innate workin g hypothesis" which
AiOTc Y , 1S ° nly ^Proximately adapted to the
^ofthething-in-itself.
shi 4 ^ lo 8ist attempts to grasp the relation-
Plastic" ditar ? str ucture to the regulated
unive 1 \ ° f a ^ tllat is or 8 amc > ne arrives at a

intelleT ^ h ° lding both for P h y sical and
ual structures and as valid for the

plastic protoplasm and the skeletal elements
of a protozoan as for the categorical forms of
thought and the creative plasticity of the hu-
man mind. From its simplest beginnings in
the domain of the protozoa, solid structure is
just as much a condition for any higher evolu-
tion as is organic plasticity. In this sense, solid
structure is just as indispensable and as con-
sistent a property of living matter as is its
plastic freedom. However, every solid struc-
ture, although indispensable as a support for
the organic system, carries with it an unde-
sired side effect: it makes for rigidness, and
takes away a certain degree of freedom from
the system. Every enlistment of a mechanical
structure means in some sense to bind one-
self. Von Uexkuell has said aptly: "The amoeba
is less of a machine than the horse," thinking
mainly about physical properties. Nietzsche
has expressed poetically the same relationship
between structure and plasticity in human
thought: "... a thought-Now still hot liquid
lava, but all lava builds a castle around itself.
Every thought finally crushes itself with laws
This simile of a structure crystallizing out of
the liquid state goes much deeper than Nietz-
sche sensed: It is not entirely impossible that
all that becomes solid, in the intellectual-
psychic as well as in the physical is bound o
be a transition from the liquid state of certam
plasma parts to the solid state

But Nietzsche's simile and Uexkuell s state
mentoverlooksomethin g .Thehorse.sahighe

animal than the amoeba not despite but ^ a
large extent because of its being richer in _ sol d
differentiated structures. Organisms with as

bae whether they like it or not, for wi nou

any solid Structure all higher
any soim symbolize organ-

inconceivable. One coma y ff tiated
isms with a maximum of highly diff erent
fixed structures as lobsters, stiffly _ armor

joints with precisely

move along a prescrioe . fl _
switching pom s . For ^
creasing mental and ^
is always a compromise betwe

237

KONRAD LORENZ

extremes, neither one representing the high-
est realization of the possibilities of organic
creation. Always and everywhere differentia-
tion to a higher level of mechanical structure
has the dangerous tendency to fetter the mind,
whose servant it was just a moment ago, and
to prevent its further evolution. The hard exo-
skeleton of the arthropods is such an obstruc-
tion in evolution, as is also the fixed instinc-
tual movements of many higher organisms
and the industrial machinery of man.

Indeed, every system of thought that com-
mits itself to a nonplastic "absolute" has this
same fettering effect. The moment such a sys-
tem is finished, when it has disciples who be-
lieve in its perfection, it is already "false."
Only in the state of becoming is the philoso-
pher a human being in the most proper mean-
ing of the word. I am reminded of the beautiful
definition of man which we owe to the pragma-
tist and which probably is given in its clearest
formulation in Gehlen's book Der Mensch
Man is defined as the permanently unfinished
bang, permanently unadapted and poor in
structure, but continuously open to the world
continuously in the state of becoming

When the human thinker, be it even the
greatest, has finished his system, he has in a
fundamental way taken on something of the
propemes of the lobster or the railroad car

mXth ingeniously his disci P les ™y ™ :

n pulate the prescribed and permitted degrees
will only be a blessing for the progress of hu

™ his crutch of J,k !' "? ever >' one 'taps
™»s ol thought of the a

238

priori: They, too, are held to be absolute! Hie
machine whose species-preserving meaning
was originally in quantifying real external
things, the machine that was created for "count-
ing rams" suddenly pretends to be absolute
and buzzes with an admirable absence of in-
ternal friction and contradiction, but only as
long as it runs empty, counting its own shov-
els. If one lets a dredging-machine, an engine,
a band saw, a theory, or an a priori function of
thought run empty in this way, then its func-
tion proceeds ipso facto without noticeable
friction, heat, or noise; for the parts in such a
system do not, of course, contradict one an-
other and so fit together intelligibly and in a
well-tuned manner. When empty they are in-
deed "absolute," but absolutely empty. Only
when the system is expected to work, that is,
to achieve something in relation to the ex-
ternal world in which the real and species-
preserving meaning of its whole existence
does indeed consist, then the thing starts to
groan and crack: when the shovels of the
dredging-machine dig into the soil, the teetn
of the band saw dig into the wood, or the as-
sumptions of the theory dig into the materia
of empirical facts which is to be class* ,
then develop the undesirable side-noises tn
come from the inevitable imperfection or e
ery naturally developed system: and noo
systems exist for the natural scientist. But ^
noises are just what does indeed re P rese t " rna i
coping of the system with the real ex e
world. In this sense they are the door tW
which the thing-in-itself peeps into our ^
of phenomena, the door through wni

its pieces road to further knowledge continues to

They, and not the unresisting em f^ e<
ming of the apparatus, are "reality. ^
indeed, what we have to place unaer tn e
nifying glass if we want to get to
imperfections of our apparatus °
and experience and if we want to gai ^

edge beyond these imP erfe f° n . S hod ically if
noises have to be considered met ^
the machine is to be improved. ^ rfe£t
mentals of pure reason are just as ^ ^
and down to earth as the band saw,
just as real.

KANT AND CONTEMPORARY BIOLOGY

Our working hypothesis should read as fol-
lows: Everything is a working hypothesis. This
holds true not only for the natural laws which
we gain through individual abstraction a pos-
teriori from the facts of our experience, but
also for the laws of pure reason. The faculty of
understanding does not in itself constitute an
explanation of phenomena, but the fact that it
projects phenomena for us in a practically us-
able form on to the projection-screen of our
experiencing is due to its formulation of work-
ing hypotheses, developed in evolution and
tested through millions of years. Santayana
says: "Faith in the intellect is the only faith
that has justified itself by the fruit it has borne.
But the one who clings forever to the form of
faith is a Don Quixote, rattling with out-
moded armor. I am a decided materialist with
regard to natural philosophy, but I do not
claim to know what matter is. I am waiting for
the men of science to tell me that."

Our view that all human thought is only a
working hypothesis must not be interpreted
« lowering the value of the knowledge se-
wed by mankind. It is true that this knowl-
edge is only a working hypothesis for us, it is
tr ue that we are ready at any moment to throw
overboard our favorite theories when new
•acts demand this. But even if nothing is "ab-
s °wtely true," every new piece of knowledge,
ey ery new truth, is nevertheless a step forward
'n a very definite, definable direction: the ab-
solutely existent is apprehended from a new,
_ P to this point unknown, aspect; it is covered
"a new characteristic. For us that working
^ypothesis is true which paves the way for the

not * ' n knowled § e or which at least does
obstruct the way. Human science must act

pQ e * scaff olding for reaching the greatest

ingf hdght ' with out its absolute extent be-

At th reSCeable at the Start of the construction -
com e m ° ment when su ch a construction is
pi |] mit ' ed to a permanently set supporting

tain f ktter fits onl y a buildin § of a cer '
and ^ fm and size - Once these are reached
i ng ... e buil <% is to continue, the support-
Process* 55 ^ demolished and rebuilt > a
0Us ^ icl1 can become the more danger-
r the entire structure, the more deeply

that which is to be rebuilt is set in its founda-
tion. Since it is a constituent property of all true
science that its structure should continue to
grow into the boundless, all that is mechani-
cally systematic, all that corresponds to solid
structures and scaffolding, must always be
something provisional, alterable at any time.
The tendency to secure one's own building for
the future by declaring it absolute leads to the
opposite of the intended success: Just that
"truth" which is dogmatically believed in,
sooner or later leads to a revolution in which
the actual truth-content and value of the old
theory are all too easily demolished and for-
gotten along with the obsolete obstructions
to progress. The heavy cultural losses which
may accompany revolutions are special cases
of this phenomenon. The character of all
truths as working hypotheses must always be
kept in mind, in order to prevent the neces-
sity of demolishing the established structure,
and in order to preserve for the "established"
truths, that eternal value which they poten-
tially deserve.

Our conception that a priori forms of
thought and intuition have to be understood
just as any other organic adaptation carries
with it the fact that they are for us "inherited
working hypotheses," so to speak, whose
truth-content is related to the absolutely exis-
tent in the same manner as that of ordinary
working hypotheses which have proven them-
selves just as splendidly adequate in coping
with the external world. This conception, it
is true, destroys our faith in the absolute truth
of any a priori thesis necessary for thought
On the other hand it gives the conviction that
something actual "adequately con«|>«*
to every phenomenon in our world Even the
smallest detail of the world of phenomena
"mirrored" for us by the innate working ; hy-
potheses of our forms of intuition and though
is in fact pre-formed to the phenomenon .t

tures and the external world in general (ej,

of the horse, above). It is true

is only a box whose form unpretentiously

239

KONRAD LORENZ

that of the actuality to be portrayed. This
box, however, is accessible to our inves-
tigation even if we cannot comprehend the
thing-in-itself except by means of the box.
But access to the laws of the box, i.e., of the
instrument, makes the thing-in-itself rela-
tively comprehensible.

Now what we are planning to do in patient
empirical research work is an investigation of
the "a priori," of the "innate" working hypoth-
eses present in subhuman organisms. This in-
cludes species that achieve a correspondence
to the properties, of the thing-in-itself less de-
tailed than that of man. With all their incred-
ible accuracy of aim, the innate schematisms
of animals are still much more simple, of
coarser screen, than those of man, so that the
boundaries of their achievement still fall
within the measurable domain of our own re-
ceptive apparatus. Let us take as analogy the
domain that can be resolved with the lens of a

tTrr t r : ; he fineness ° f the smai1 ^ «™-

ture of the ob) ect still visible with it is depen-
dent upon the relationship between angie of
^;-nd focal length, the so- called^

Tm IT":- ^ fim diffraction ^pec-
rum which is thrown by the structural Lt-

do not exist Z neness ' finer ones

^ve no ^ ' "* ^ ° bjeCtS ' 1 ^
thCTZonT that thiS C ° lor h ™

^■ho^To^ 1 : the visibie str -

^"cturLSr" 1 * <W for

s keptical toward o, : 0ne WOuld be very
mac a "d pr noun C e d 1 0mC * me S aloma -

240

sion from the comparison of the limits of
achievement and the fact that the various in-
struments register brown. The conclusion is
that even the most powerful lenses have lim-
its as to the fineness of structure resolved, just
as do simpler apparatuses. In a methodically
similar way one can learn much from the
functional limitations which the various ap-
paratuses for organizing the image of the
universe all have. The lesson so learned pro-
vides an important critical perspective for
judging the limits of achievement of the high-
est existing apparatus, which today cannot be
investigated from the observation tower of a
still higher one.

Looking at it from a physiological view-
point, it is self-evident that our neural appara-
tus for organizing the image of the world is
basically like a photoprint screen which can-
not reproduce any finer points of the thing-in-
itself than those corresponding to the numeri-
cally finite elements of the screen. Just as the
grain of the photographic negative permits no
image originating from unlimited enlarge-

ment, so also there are limitations in

the im-

age of the universe traced out by our sense
organs and cognitive apparatus. These too
permit no unlimited "enlargement," no un-
limited view of details, however s elf ' evl *J
and real the image may appear at su P e *
inspection. Where the physical image o
universe formed by man has advanced to
atomic level, there emerge in;

accuracies »

the coordination between the a priori ne
sities of thought" and the empiriajj 1 .
It is as though the "measures o^ 11 ^
was simply too coarse and too appr ^
for these finer spheres of measuremen ,^
would only agree in general and at a statis^ ^
probabilistic level with that which is .
comprehended of the thing-in-it** ^
increasingly true for atomic V^'^.
entirely impalpable ideas can no ^f«^
perienced directly. For we can only j
as experience" in a directly eX P erl ssi0 „ to \
manner (to apply Kant's own f^^t- j
this physiological fact) that whid i ca^, rf
ten on the crudely simplifying w ;
our central nervous system. But in

KANT AND CONTEMPORARY BIOLOGY

organisms, this keyboard can be differenti-
ated in a more simple or more complex man-
ner. To represent it by the analogy of the pho-
toprint screen, the best possible picture that
can be reproduced by an apparatus of a given
degree of fineness corresponds to those repre-
sentations encountered in cross-stitch em-
broideries which build round- contoured ani-
mals and flowers from small rectangular
elements. The property of "being composed
of squares" does in no way belong to the rep-
resented thing-in-itself, but is due to a pecu-
liarity of the picture apparatus, a peculiarity
which can be regarded as a technically un-
avoidable limitation. Similar limitations ac-
company each apparatus for organizing the
image of the world, if only because of its be-
"ig composed of cellular elements (as is the
case for vision). Now if one examines me-
thodically what the cross-stitch representa-
tion permits to be stated about the form of
the thing-in-itself, the conclusion is that the
accuracy of the statement is dependent upon
the relationship between the size of the pic-
ture and the grain of the screen. If one square
ls out of line with a straight-line contour in
the embroidery, one knows that behind it lies
an actual projection of the represented thing,

°ne is not sure whether it exactly fills the

but

w hole square of the screen or only the small-
er part of it. This question can be decided
only with the help of the next finest screen.

W behind every detail which even the crud-
es screen reproduces there certainly lies
something real, simply because otherwise the
jspective screen-unit would not have regis-
" But no tool is at our disposal to deter-
ge what lies behind the registering of the

nest existent screen-unit, whether much or
e of the contour of that which is to be re-
V° uced protrudes into its domain. The fun-
the m f" tal 'ndiscernibility of the last detail of

vinced ^ itSdf remains - We are onl y con "
doe" 311 details which our apparatus
b ute S s re P roduce correspond to actual attri-
m 0r S thin g" in - its elf- One becomes

tirell 3n< ! m ° re firmly convinced of this en-
Real a !? laWful correlation between the
the Apparent, the more one con-

cerns oneself with the comparison of appara-
tuses for organizing the image of the world of
animals as different from one another as pos-
sible. The continuity of the thing-in-itself,
most convincingly emerging from such com-
parisons, is completely incompatible with the
supposition of an alogical, extrinsically de-
termined relationship between the thing-in-
itself and its appearances.

Such comparative research brings us closer
to the actual world lying behind the phenom-
ena, providing we succeed in showing that the
different a priori formations of possible reac-
tion (and thus of possible experience) of the
different species make experienceable the
same lawfulness of real existents and lead to
its control in a species-preserving way. Such
different adaptations to one and the same law-
fulness strengthen our belief in its reality in
the same manner as a judge's belief in the ac-
tuality of an event is strengthened by several
mutually independent witnesses giving de-
scriptions of it that are in general agreement,
though not identical. Organisms that are on a
much lower mental level than man struggle
quite evidently with the same data that are
made experienceable in our world by the
forms of perception of space and time and by
the category of causality; but they do it by
means of quite different and much simpler
achievements, which are accessible to scien-
tific analysis. Even if the a priori human forms
of perception and thought remain inaccessible
to causal analysis for the time being, we as
natural scientists must nevertheless desist
from explaining the existence of the a prior,
(or in general of pure reason) by a principle
extraneous to nature. We must instead regard
any such explanatory attempt as a completely
arbitrary and dogmatic division between the
rationally comprehensible and the unknow-
able, a division which has done as serious
damage in obstructing research, as have the
prohibitions of the vitalists.

The method to be used can be explained, by
analogy to the microscope, as a science o ^ap-
paratuses. Basically, we can comprehend only
the lower precursors of our own forms of
perception and thought. Only where laws

241

KONRAD LORENZ

represented through these primitive organs
can be identified with those represented on
our own apparatus can we clarify properties
of the human a priori, using the more primi-
tive as a starting point. In this way we can
draw conclusions about the continuity of the
world lying behind phenomena. Such an en-
terprise succeeds quite well compared with
the theory of the a priori forms of perception
of space and the category of causality. A large
number of animals do not comprehend the
"spatial" structurization of the world in the
same way we do. We can, however, have an ap-
proximate idea what the "spatial" looks like in
the world-picture of such organisms because
•n addition to our spatial apprehension we
also possess the ability to master spatial prob-
ems in their manner. Most reptiles, birds, and
lower mammals do not master problems of
space as we do through a simultaneous clear
survey over thedata. Instead, spatial problems
^re arned by rote. For example, a water shrew
when placed ,nto new surroundings gradually

ng about constantly guided by sniffing and

perhaps a child learns piano pi eces by rote In

of the™ pam f fT d * a mother linking
ing and S d v" ^ m ° Vements > ^oth

^232 he ? elves by becomi "g

^ZtZT d ' CXtend farther and

smoothlv has nil. Mm 8 off fast and

of movtment, so ] a k, , eSe se 1 u «>ces

do not take the "shnrt T nd smo °thly>
^ chance d tet T*' ° n the c °n-
SUch * P«h lea ^ ^
•^•hewinding^^^ 11 ^-happens
«he animal necL^rii efSects without
0f ^ path ^ST Cin8h0wthe «d
^^-Perfluous^ ^ d0Ser * cutting

for an ar
masters its 1

242

For an animal, like" 7k.
'"T* '* living space a , Shrew > tha *

by no means valid

that the straight line is the shortest connec-
tion between two points. If it wanted to steer
in a straight line (which lies basically within
its abilities) it would constantly have to ap-
proach its goal sniffing, feeling with its whis-
kers and using its eyes, which are not very ef-
ficient. In this process it would use up more
time and energy than by going the path it
knows by rote. If two points which on this
path lie quite far apart are spatially close to-
gether, the animal knows it not. Even a hu-
man being can behave in this way, for exam-
ple, in a strange city. It is true, however, that
under such circumstance we humans succeed
sooner or later in getting a spatial survey
which opens up the possibility of a straight-
line short cut for us. The sewer rat, which is on
a much higher mental level than the shrew,
likewise soon finds short cuts. The greylag
goose could, as we have seen, achieve the same
thing, but does not do it for religious reasons,
as it were; it is prevented by that peculiar inhi-
bition which also ties primitive people so
much to habit. The biological meaning of this
rigid clinging to "tradition" is easily under-
standable: it will always be advisable for an
organism that does not have at its disposal a
spatial-temporal-causal survey over a certain
situation to persist rigidly in the behavior tha
has proved successful and free of danger- o
called magical thought, by no means pre*"
only in primitive people, is closely related to
this phenomenon. One need only think o
the well-known "knock on wood." The mot*
that "after all, one cannot tell what is going
happen if one omits doing it" is very clear. ^
For the true kinesthetic creature, sue ^
the water shrew, it is literally impossible as
as its thinking is concerned to find a shortC nal
Perhaps it learns one when forced by exttf
circumstances, but again only by learn ' n ^ js
rote, this time a new path. Otherwise «*
an impenetrable wall for the water shre
tween two loops of its path, even when hnetf
almost or actually touch. How many sue ^
possibilities of solution, in principle eq
simple, we humans may overlook wit
blindness in the struggle with our ^J^.
lems! This thought obtrudes itself witn

KANT AND CONTEMPORARY BIOLOGY

pelling force upon anyone who in his direct
daily associations with animals has come to
know their many human characteristics and
at the same time the fixed limits to their achieve-
ment. Nothing can be more apt to make the
scientist doubt his own God-like character,
and to inculcate in him a very beneficial
modesty.

From a psychological viewpoint, the water
shrew's command of space is a sequence of
conditioned reflexes and kinesthetically in-
grained movements. It reacts to the known
steering marks of its path with conditioned
reflexes which are less a steering than a con-
trol to ascertain that it is still on the right
path, for the kinesthetic movement known by
rote is so precise and exact that the process
takes place almost without optical or tactile
steering, as in the case of a good piano player
who need hardly look at the score or the keys.
Jhis sequence formation of conditioned re-
flexes and known movements is by no means
°nly a spatial but also a spatial-temporal for-
mation. It can be produced only in one di-
rection. To run the course backward requires
completely different trainings. To run the
Paths learned by rote the wrong way is just as
impossible as t0 recite the alphabet in the
r °ng sequence. If one interrupts the animal

nmng along its trained path, taking away a
or; * hat has to be jumped, it becomes dis-

ented and tries to reconnect the chain of

fore"! 8ramed Unks at an earlier P lace - There "
orie t H UnS baCk Searches until h becomes re-

lustrw m the signs ° f its path and tries a s ain -
in ra * 3 llttle § irl that has been interrupted
'"^tmgapoem.

f 0Und r ^ ationshi P very similar to the one we
ine na n, et r een the dis P°sition toward learn-

ceptb f y r ° te 3nd the human form of Po-
tion to , Space exists between the disposi-
fesociati devdopin 8 conditioned reflexes
Cau salitv°Th S) ' thC human category of
st 'mulus f ° rganism learns that a certain
keeper a i exam P le > the appearance of the
event, fet** 5 * precedes * biologically relevant
tMfo eV ent US feedin 8 ; il "associates" these
the 0ccur J treats the first as th e signal for
rrence of the second one by starting

preparatory reactions upon the onset of the
first stimulus (e.g., the salivation reflex in-
vestigated by Pavlov). This connection of an
experience with the regularly followed post
hoc is totally unrelated to causal thought. It
should be remembered that, for example,
kidney secretion, a completely unconscious
process, can be trained to conditioned reflexes!
The reason why post hoc was still equated with
and mistaken for propter hoc is that the dispo-
sition for association and causal thought actu-
ally achieve the same thing biologically; they
are, so to speak, organs for coping with the
same real datum.

This datum is without any doubt the natu-
ral lawfulness contained in a major thesis of
physics. The "conditioned reflex" arises when
a certain outer stimulus, which is meaning-
less for the organism as such, is followed sev-
eral times by another, biologically meaningful
one, that is, one releasing a reaction. The ani-
mal from now on behaves "as if" the first
stimulus were a sure signal preceding the bio-
logically significant event that is to be ex-
pected. This behavior obviously has a species-
preserving meaning only if in the framework
of the real a connection between the first, the
"conditioned" and the second, the "uncondi-
tioned" stimulus, exists. A lawful temporal
sequence of different events regularly occurs
in nature only where a certain quantity of en-
ergy appears sequentially in different phe-
nomenal forms through transformation of
force. Thus connection in itself means "causal
connection." The conditioned reflex "advocates
the hypothesis" that two stimuli, occurring
several times in a certain sequence, are phe-
nomenal forms of the same quantity of en-
ergy. Were this supposition false and the re-
peated sequence conditioning the association
of the stimuli only a purely accidental one a
probably never returning "post hoc, then the
developmentoftheconditionedreaction would

be a dysteleological failure ofjcUevem^™
the part of a disposition which is general*
and probabilistically meaningful, in the sense

ical foundations, we canexamme the category

243

KONRAD LORENZ

of causality only through critical epistemol-
ogy. In its biological function, it is an organ
for comprehending the same natural lawful-
ness aimed at by the disposition to acquire
conditioned reflexes. We cannot define the
concept of cause and effect in any other way
than by determining that the effect receives
energy from the cause in some form or other
The essence of "propter hoc" which alone dif-
ferentiates it qualitatively from a "uniform
post hoc hes in the fact that cause and effect
are successive links in the infinite chain of
phenomenal forms that energy assumes in the
course of its everlasting existence

attempt to explain it as a secondary abstrac

post hoc ' 'Tl mtl ° n ofa Regular

ua!ity°whi h ^ higWy ^

use of "why' a nd "he »" ^ S£nsible
child n because" even by a little

force and Heat ? a ( " Matter > Livin g
in a surpdt dv T T ^ P " 265) decla -d

^ w^^^^be de-

quite naively take, th 8 Physicist thus

question, from the po^nf ^interesting
of ideas, whether * ° f * e histor y

-heat he st a t :i°^° fth -quiv y

°f cause and effect thLT mt0 ° ur con «pt
" USali *y is actually b^r^^-y of
the '"Citable sequel It ^ n ° thin S b *
* ca « happen that th l^T events and that
,ln ! e doe * not draw t CCU " in 8 Iater in

Cedl "g one, but thlt lh 87 fr ° m the Im-
pendent siH^u. 1 both are mutuallv

faster than the other, thus always preceding it
in experience. Thus lightning follows electri-
cal discharge more quickly than thunder
Nevertheless, the optical phenomenon is fcv
no means the cause of the acoustic one! Per-
haps one may object here that this consider-
ation is hairsplitting, and for many naive peo-
ple lightning still is the cause for thunder. Bui
the hairsplitting frees us from a primitive
conception and moves us one step closer to
the real connection of things. Mankind today
lives by the function of the innate category of
causality.

We shall now examine methodologically
the functionally analogous achievements ot
animals from the higher observation tower o!
human form of perception of space and cate-
gory of causality; first, the disposition to kin-
esthetic learning by rote of paths, and then
the disposition to blind association of se
quential events. Is it "true" what the water
shrew "knows" about the spatial? In the water
shrew's case, learning creates an "ordoetcon
nectio idearum," also visible in our image
of the universe: namely, the condition that
places and locomotive parts are strung ; i ' {
a row of pearls. The water shrew's order*
scheme is entirely correct— as far as it reac «■
In our perception the string of pearls is«
ble, too; the sequence of the links is true, n.
for us there exists (and are true) an imn>»
number of further data which the s r
lacks: for example, the possibility to shor -

the loops of a path. Also from a pr a S mJt "
point of vie
higher degn
the universe

* 1 • true t" i

point of view, our perception is " ^

higher degree than is the animal's imag

Something very similar results w ^
compare the disposition to associatl ° n m0l t
our causal thought: here, too, the lower ' acon .
primitive rendering by the animal grv^ ^
nection between the events which e» ^ ^
for our form of thought: the ^fi^i
tionship between cause and effect. M

thai

f ""'v. The ca* c ° b " Xbm > chain of

actuality, essential to our causal t ^°"| e e ffect
energy is received from the cause by ^
°f is not given to purely associative
g- Here, too, then the lower form of tnoug
one occurs responds a priori and adequately to tnr

KANT AND CONTEMPORARY BIOLOGY

of a higher order, but again only as far as it
reaches. Here, too, human form of thought is
more true from the pragmatist's point of view;
think of all it achieves that cannot be achieved
by pure association! As I have said, we all live
by the work of this important organ, almost
as by the work of our hands.

With all the emphasis on these differences
in the degree of correspondence between im-
age of the universe and actuality, we must not
forget for one moment that something real is
reflected even in the most primitive "screens"
of the apparatuses for organizing the image of
the universe. It is important to emphasize this
because we humans likewise use such appara-
tuses even though they may be very different.
Progress in science always has a certain ten-
dency to de-anthropomorphize our image
of the universe, as Bertalanffy has correctly
Pointed out. From the palpable and sensible
Phenomenon of light, the impalpable, unvisu-
al'zable concept of wave phenomena has de-
ve 'oped. The self-evident comprehension of
causality is replaced by considerations of
Probability and arithmetic calculations, etc.

e can actually say that among our forms of
Perception and categories there are "more an-
Jopomorphic" ones and "less anthropomor-
P 'c ones; or some that are more specialized
" 0tl | ers that are more general. Doubtless a

»nal being lacking the sense of vision
wh , com Prehend the wave theory of light,

1 e not comprehending specifically human
cificT"!! 1 eXperience - Looking beyond spe-
h 'ghest d Stmctures ' as is done to the
not 1 S a i in matnemati cal science, must
mo h t0 the view that the less anthropo-
degre "f representation s approach a higher
the ■ thi n aCtUality> that is > that the y approach
'^per" 8 m ltSClf m ° re closeIv than does na "
^onha ^ 11011 ' ^ more P rimitive reproduc-
lutel y / JUSt aS rCal a relation ship to the abso-
th e ani XlSt f, nt as does th e higher one. Thus,
image of 1 th apparatus for organizing the
detail, ana Un ' Verse reproduces only one
fr °m th. n m 3 purelv associative manner,
energy J^* 1 ^ of the transformation of

an °the'r one ^ & certain event P recedes
In tlme - But one can in no way

assert that the statement "a cause precedes
an effect" is less true than the statement that
an effect arises from the preceding phenom-
enon through transformation of energy. The
advance from the more simple to the more
differentiated lies in the fact that additional,
new definitions are added to those already
existing. If in such an advance from a more
primitive reproduction of the universe to a
higher one certain data which are repre-
sented in the first are neglected in the sec-
ond, then it is only a question of change in
point of view, and not a matter of a closer ap-
proach to the absolutely existent. The most
primitive reactions of the protozoa reflect an
aspect of the world to which all organisms
must similarly relate, just as much as do the
calculations of a Homo sapiens who studies
theoretical physics. But we can no more as-
certain how much exists in absolute actuality
in addition to the facts and relationships ren-
dered in our image of the universe than the
water shrew can ascertain that it could short-
cut many detours in its crooked path learning.

With regard to the absolute validity of our
"necessities of thought" we are accordingly
modest: We believe only that in some details
they correspond more to the actually existent
than do those of the water shrew. Above all,
we are conscious of the fact that we surely are
just as blind in regard to as many additional
things as that animal is: that we too are lack-
ing the receptive organs for infinitely much
that is actual. The forms of perception and
categories are not the mind, but rather are
tools the mind uses. They are innate struc-
tures that on the one hand support, but on the
other hand make for rigidity like all that is
solid, Kant's great conception of the idea ot
freedom, namely that the thinking being is
responsible to the totality of the universe, suf-
fers from the ailment of being chained to the
rigidly mechanical laws of pure reason The a
priori and the preformed ways of thought a"
U the ones that are by no means speaficaUy
human as such. Specifically
is the conscious drive not to get stuck not *
become a vehicle running on nib, butcher
to maintain a youthful openness to the world,

245

KONRAD LORENZ

and to come closer to actuality through a con-
stant reciprocal interaction with it.

Being biologists, we are modest regarding
man's position in the totality of nature, but
more demanding in regard to what the future
may yet bring us in the way of knowledge. To
declare man absolute, to assert that any imag-
inable rational being, even angels, would have
to be limited to the laws of thought of Homo
sapiens, appears to us to be incomprehensible
arrogance. For the lost illusion of a unique
lawfulness for man, we exchange the convic-
tion that in his openness to the world he is
basically capable of outgrowing his science
and the a priori formulations of his thought,
and of creating and realizing basically new
things that have never existed before. To the
extent he remains inspired by the will not to
let every new thought be choked by the cover
of the laws crystallizing around it, in the fash-
ion of Nietzsche's drops of lava, this develop-
ment w,l „ot so soon encounter any essential

» the greatness, and, at least on our planet the

nds I!" 60 aU ^ gigantk di ff-entia t ion
nc structure, it is an organ whose func-

on possesses a proteus-like changeability a
e t„ t ons Qn h ^

"Hdstc^^

^t^^^^thW would

humanre ; fo n r a h Urahstk fetation of

^ eyes of mo s nt? MCred? (This * is *
invi ewoffe own " Kamians -)° r would he,
Nonary IZ^T^ ^ hes to
option thai f org an t 1^ ° Ur con '

l m <"* ^ G ;dfo4tn e K n t 0tS ° methin g

^initscreaZtohr 18
me «ts, especially in 1 eV ° lu L tl0nar y achieve-
rs, hurn a „ re [1 ^ hi 8 hes t achieve-

** inclined to believe 2 u™" m ° rals? We
,h ^ciencecouldIi h ^
on| y «* earthen f ee " oT ^ 3 ^ b *
P^wn who reproarll an " madeidoi - The
P ° aChes us with lacking re -

spect for the greatness of our philosopher we
counter by quoting Kant himself: "If one starts
with an idea founded but not realized and be-
queathed to us by another, by continual think-
ing one can hope to progress further than did
the ingenious man to whom one owed the
spark of this light." The discovery ofthe a pri-
ori is that spark we owe to Kant and it is surely
not arrogance on our part to criticize the in-
terpretation of the discovery by means of new
facts (as we did in criticizing Kant with regard
to the origin of the forms of perception and
categories). This critique does not lower the
value of the discovery any more than it lowers
that of the discoverer. To anyone, following
the erroneous principle "Omni naturalia sunt
turpia," who persists in seeing a desecration
in our attempt to look at human reason natu-
ralistically we counter by again quoting Kant
himself: "When we speak of the totality of na-
ture, we must inevitably conclude that there is
Divine regulation. But in each phase of na-
ture" (since none are at first given simply"
our sensory world) "we have the obligation*

search for underlying causes, in so

far as pos-

sible, and to pursue the causal chain, so long
as it hangs together, according to laws that art
known to us."

NOTES

246

1. Translated from: Kant's Lehre von^
orischen im Lichte geganwartiger Biologie.
fur Deutsche Philosophic 1941, 94-125. H>»^
translation has been prepared by Cnarlott< L asS is-
and edited by Donald T. Campbell with it
tance of Professor Lorenz and William A. ^ ^
Ghurye, Lorenz, and Reupke have not ha^ ^
portunity to see the translation in P reS - t
While the translation is still veryun^^
one naivete of wording which represents
ate avoiding of some more s0 P histl " r e haS W
The hyphenated phrase 'thing-in-itseU
used as a translation for the Kantian f> r
an sich," "An sich Seienden," "An sic
den," "An sich der Dinge," An sich e ^
Natur," etc. This has seemed P referab anslat ed,<> t
usual usage of leaving the phrase * niri ^^f-
of translating it into the Greek " noum ^ at the *
serve some Kantian distinctions even

THE VIEW FROM SOMEWHERE

pense of awkward renditions, these equivalents
have been used: Wahrnehmung=perception; An-
schauung=intuition; Realitat= reality; Wirklich-
keit=actuality; Gegenstand= object; Ding=thing.

2. Prolegomena, First Part, note III. The present
translators have used here the translation of Kant
provided by P. G. Lucas, Manchester University
Press, 1953.

3. Translation of P. G. Lucas, Manchester Uni-
versity Press, 1953.

4. Rats and other mammals that are on a higher
mental level than the water shrew notice such pos-
sibilities of a short cut immediately. I experienced
a highly interesting case with a greylag goose in
which the possibility of a short cut in path learning
was undoubtedly noticed, but not made use of.
When a gosling, this bird had acquired a path
learning which led through the door of our house
and up two flights of a wide staircase to my room,
where the goose used to spend the night. In the
morning it used to make its exit by flying through
the window. When learning the path, the young
greylag goose ran first of all toward a large window

the yet strange staircase, past the lowest step.
Many birds, when disquieted, strive for the light,

so this goose, too, decided to leave the window
jndcome to the landing to which I had wanted to
ead it only after it had quieted down a little. This
e our to the window remained once and for all an
dispensable part of the path learning which the
« «Jtog goose had to go through on its way to the

place where it used to sleep. This very steep detour
to the window and back gave a very mechanical ef-
fect, almost like a habitually performed ceremony,
because its original motivation (anxiety and there-
fore shying away from the darkness) was no longer
present. In the course of this goose's path learning,
which took almost two years, the detour became
gradually leveled off, that is, the line originally
going almost as far as the window and back had
now sloped down to an acute angle by which the
goose deflected its course toward the window and
mounted the lowest step at the extremity facing the
window. This leveling off of the unnecessary would
probably have led to attaining the actually shortest
way in two more years and had nothing to do with
insight. But a goose is, properly speaking, basically
capable of finding such a simple solution by insight;
though habit prevails over insight or prevents it.
One evening the following happened. I had forgot-
ten to let the goose into the house, and when I fi-
nally remembered, it was standing impatiently on
the door step and rushed past me and— to my great
surprise— for the first time took the shortest way
and up the stairs. But already on the third step it
stopped, stretched its neck, uttered the warning
cry, turned around, walked the three steps down
again, made the detour to the window hastily and
"formally" and then mounted the stairs calmly in
the usual way. Here obviously the possibility of a
solution by insight was blocked only by the exis-
tence of that learned by training!

Michael ruse

Jhe View from Somewhere:
Critical Defense of Evolutionary Epistemology

evoj 68 Darwin ' the father of modern
of evol? 17 the ° ry ' hit u P° n his mechanism
wherp ♦ throu 8 h natural selection

some-

(Z e i97o a ^ S tl * end o7Ve^mber""l838
to think of P ° Vat 1981) - At once > he started
species 1° T P ° Ssible a Pp!ications to our own
/ «• indeed. th P

evolutionary speculations in On the Origin of
Species in 1859, he said little about our own
species, simply noting that his general views
would have specific applications for Homo

S<1 This 5 ' silence was not cowardice. Darwin
never wanted to conceal the impli cations ; of
his ideas, but he was concerned first to mate
as full a case as he could for the general the

un select^ ' ^ VCry firSt ex P licit writin 8 s
note t>ooks n W in Darwins P rivate

tober isio ° CCUrrin g around the end of Oc- as ran a — * j. uman

Cech ^ C ° nSider P° ssible implications of ory. Finally, in 1871, Darwin ™»fj°^

< a :r n human th ° u ^ beings in thdr t ti^e^p.

f ' when Darwin finally published his detailed treatment in his The Descent j

247